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NOTES
THE PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURER'S ACTION FOR
RESCISSION FOR MISREPRESENTATION: LIMITING A
POTENTIAL THREAT TO PRIVATE SECTOR
PARTICIPATION IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE
MARKET
The national secondary mortgage market experienced tremendous growth
during the 1970s and 1980s. 1 The highly successful and well-established
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA),2 Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA),3 and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration (FHLMC)4 set the stage for this period of growth by establishing
a stable and standardized market in both government insured and conven-
tional mortgage loans. 5 Private mortgage banking concerns recognized an
opportunity to enter an increasingly lucrative market and began pooling,
packaging, and selling mortgage loans to secondary investors throughout
the country.
6
This growth in private market activity gave rise to a need for private
mortgage guaranty insurance on the loans that the mortgage banking con-
cerns securitized and sold on the secondary market, as potential investors
in the secondary market looked to the presence of private mortgage insurance
as evidence that an impartial underwriter had examined the quality of the
underlying loans and determined the risk of default to be within insurable
I. See generally FEDERAL HoE LOAN MORTGAGE CORP'ORATION, PUB. No. 67, A
CiTIEN'S GUIDE TO THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET (rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter FHLMC
CnITEN's GUIDE] (describing growth of secondary mortgage market with emphasis on federal
government involvement); K. LoRE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: DELOPMENTS AND TRENDS
IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET (1985) (reviewing recent growth of secondary mortgage
market and describing specific financing mechanisms employed in secondary mortgage market);
MORTGAGE INSURANCE ComPANIEs OF AMERICA, 1988 FACT BOOK AND DIRECTORY (1988)
[hereinafter MICA FACT BOOK] (describing recent growth of secondary mortgage market and
increase of private entity activity in secondary mortgage market); Malloy, The Secondary
Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991 (1986)
(outlining general history and operation of secondary mortgage market); Pittman, Economic
and Regulatory Developments Affecting Mortgage Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
497 (1989) (discussing history, regulation, and innovations in secondary mortgage market).
2. See infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing nature and function of FNMA).
3. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing nature and function of GNMA).
4. See infra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing function of FHLMC and impact
of recent federal legislation on FHLMC).
5. See FHLMC CrrzIN's GuImE, supra note 1, at 8-11 (describing role of federally
sponsored agencies in establishing modem secondary mortgage market).
6. See infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing increase of private sector
involvement in secondary mortgage market).
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limits. 7 In response to this need, the private mortgage insurance industry
provided more varied and flexible forms of insurance than that available
from government mortgage guaranty agencies such as the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) or the Veterans Administration (VA).' Consequently,
private mortgage insurance assumed an important role in the efficient
operation of the national secondary mortgage market.
Economic conditions in the early 1980s led to record numbers of defaults
by mortgage borrowers and claims on private mortgage insurance policies. 9
In particular, the widely publicized 1985 failure of Equity Programs In-
vestment Corporation (EPIC) resulted in the default of approximately $1.5
billion of mortgage debt.' 0 After the EPIC default and other less notable
failures, some of the private mortgage insurers sought to rescind insurance
policies covering the loans on the grounds that the mortgage lenders procured
the insurance through misrepresentations about the risk associated with the
loans involved." In the majority of reported cases, the insurers sought
rescission against original mortgage lenders who still held the mortgage
loans in their own portfolios.' 2 In two recent cases, however, including the
litigation arising out of the EPIC default, the private mortgage insurers
7. See infra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing role of private mortgage insurance
in secondary mortgage market).
8. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing role of private mortgage
insurance in secondary mortgage market and flexible nature of private mortgage insurance).
9. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing economic distress experienced
by private mortgage insurance industry in 1980s).
10. See infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text (describing EPIC investment program
and subsequent failure).
11. See Citizens Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 883 F.2d 299, 300-01 (4th
Cir. 1989) (allowing private mortgage insurer to rescind policies against mortgage lender for
misrepresentations in application made by lender's agent); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Numerica
Fin. Serv., 835 F.2d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding Florida insurance rescission statute
does not apply to mortgage insurance in insurer's action for rescission against mortgage
lenders); Wisconsin Mortgage Assurance Corp. v. HMC Mortgage Corp., 712 F. Supp. 878,
879 (D. Utah 1989) (allowing private mortgage insurer to rescind policies against mortgage
lender for misrepresentations by borrower in policy application); Firstier Mortgage Co. v.
Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 708 F. Supp. 1224, 1231 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (holding void
mortgage insurance policies on loans held by originator because of misrepresentations of
originator and borrowers in application); TCF Mortgage Corp. v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 709
F. Supp. 164, 166 (D. Minn. 1989) (allowing mortgage insurer to rescind policies against loan
originator on grounds of misrepresentation in application); Mountain Sec. Say. Bank v. United
Guar. Residential Ins. Co., 678 F. Supp. 610, 611 (W.D. Va. 1987) (permitting mortgage
insurer to rescind policy against mortgage lender for borrower's failure to disclose existing
indebtedness in insurance application); United Guar. Residential Ins. Corp. v. American Pioneer
Say. Bank, 655 F. Supp. 165, 168 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (allowing rescission of private mortgage
insurance policies against mortgage lender for misrepresentations as to borrowers' incomes);
CenTrust Mortgage Corp. v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., No. C551517, slip op. at 5 (Super. Ct.
Maricopa County, Ariz., Dec. 16, 1987) (granting rescission to private mortgage insurer against
mortgage lender for misrepresentations in insurance application); In re TMIC Ins. Co., 207
Cal. App. 3d 981, 255 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1989) (allowing California Insurance Commissioner to
avoid policies issued by mortgage insurer undergoing liquidation on grounds of misrepresen-
tations by insured mortgage lender).
12. See supra note 11 (reporting cases involving insurer seeking to rescind mortgage
insurance policy against original mortgage lender for misrepresentations by lender or borrower).
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attempted to rescind policies issued on loans that the mortgagee subsequently
had sold to secondary investors. 3
Mortgage insurers' attempts to rescind coverage in cases in which
mortgage originators have sold insured loans on the secondary market after
the issuance of the policies have called into question the proper role of
private mortgage insurance in the secondary mortgage market. 4 An exam-
ination of the history of the secondary mortgage market and of the private
mortgage insurance industry's role in the secondary market reveals that the
ability of private entities to participate in the market depends in large part
on the ability of secondary investors to place confidence in the private
mortgage insurers' underwriting efforts." The economic climate of the 1970s
and 1980s, combined with intense competition among private mortgage
insurance companies, has caused underwriting standards within the mortgage
insurance industry to decline.'6 This phenomenon threatens the continued
utility of private mortgage insurance as an enhancement of privately issued
securities in the secondary mortgage market. 17 Existing principles of contract
law allow courts to limit the insurer's right to rescind an insurance contract
if the insurer fails to underwrite reasonably the supposedly insured risk.'8
Courts should apply this limitation on the equitable action for rescission to
encourage adherence to prudent underwriting standards, to impose upon
mortgage insurers a heightened duty of inquiry into the quality of the
insured loans if the mortgagor intends to sell the loans on the secondary
market, and, consequently, to preserve the integrity of privately issued
securities in the secondary mortgage market. 9
13. See Verex Assurance, Inc. v. John Hanson Say. and Loan, Inc., 816 F.2d 1296,
1298 (9th Cir. 1987) (private mortgage insurer seeking rescission of mortgage insurance policies
against secondary purchasers of insured loans on grounds of misrepresentations by mortgage
originator); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192, 1253 (E.D. Va. 1988) (private
mortgage insurers obtaining rescission of mortgage insurance policies against secondary market
investors on grounds of misrepresentations by original mortgage lenders); infra notes 80-119
and accompanying text (describing details of EPIC litigation); infra note 131 (discussing John
Hanson).
14. See The EPIC Private Mortgage Insurance Litigation: Insurers Allowed to Rescind
Insurance, 44 Bus. LAw. 970, 974 (1989) [hereinafter Bus. LAw.] (discussing potential impact
on role of private mortgage insurance in secondary mortgage market caused by mortgage
insurer's action for rescission against secondary market investors).
15. See infra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing function of private mortgage
insurance as credit enhancement in secondary mortgage market).
16. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (discussing forces contributing to decline
of private mortgage insurers' underwriting standards during 1970s and 1980s).
17. See Bus. LAw, supra note 14, at 974 (describing potential effect upon secondary
mortgage market of decline in investor confidence in private mortgage insurance); infra note
31 and accompanying text (discussing role of private mortgage insurance in secondary mortgage
market).
18. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text (discussing contract doctrines that courts
use to limit insurer's action for rescission for misrepresentation in insurance application).
19. See infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should apply
contract law principles to limit mortgage insurers' right to rescission for misrepresentation in
insurance application if applicant has sold insured loan on secondary mortgage market).
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The modern secondary mortgage market came into being during the
depression years of the 1930s as a result of the federal government's desire
to restore confidence in the residential housing market and to make home
ownership more attainable. 20 To accomplish these goals, Congress created
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934.21 The FHA insures
mortgage loans that meet certain predetermined lending guidelines. 22 In 1944
Congress authorized the Veterans Administration (VA) to begin a similar
loan guaranty program. 23
The existence of government-insured mortgage loans gave rise to the
creation of the FNMA;24 GNMA, 2 and FHLMC. 26 These agencies are
charged with the buying and selling of FHA and VA insured loans as well
as conventional loans.2 7 Selling mortgage loans to third party investors
allows the original mortgage lender (the originator) to convert the right to
receive a stream of payments of principal and interest into a single infusion
of cash. The ability to convert a long-term obligation into cash allows
mortgage lenders to reinvest these funds at higher interest rates during times
of inflation and generally provides lenders more flexibility in managing their
loan portfolios. 8
20. See FHLMC CmzN's GUmE, supra note 1, at 8-11 (discussing history and purpose
of federally sponsored secondary mortgage market agencies); Malloy, supra note 1, at 992
(discussing depression era origins of secondary mortgage market).
21. National Housing Act of 1934, Subchap. II, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1707-1715 (1988).
22. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing FHA and VA loan eligibility
guidelines for various programs).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1715n (1988).
24. See 0. JoNrEs & L. GREBLER, THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET - ITS PURPOSE,
PERFoR ANCE AND PoTENnAL 118 (1961) (describing history and development of federal
secondary market agencies). The Federal Housing Administrator created the FNMA by charter
on February 10, 1938. Id.
25. See FHLMC CrzEN's GUrDE, supra note 1, at 9 (describing formation and functions
of FHLMC and GNMA). In 1968 Congress created the GNMA by dividing the FNMA into
two entities, one continuing under the FNMA name and the second becoming the GNMA.
Id.; National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1716b (1988) (authorizing division of
FNMA).
26. See Emergency Home Finance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (1988) (authorizing
creation of FHLMC). Congress altered certain administrative and structural aspects of the
FHLMC by enacting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (FIRREA), but the FHLMC's secondary
market operations remain substantially the same. FEDERAL HomE LOAN MORToAGE CORPORA-
TION, NEws RELEASE Aug. 9, 1989 (describing FIRREA's effects on structure and administration
of FHLMC).
27. See FHLMC CrzEN's Gum, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing functions of FHLMC
and FNMA); Malloy, supra note 1, at 994 (discussing origin and functions of federally
sponsored secondary market agencies). The GNMA purchases only FHA and VA insured loans
less than one year old, while the FNMA and FHLMC deal in both conventional loans and
older federally insured loans. Pittman, supra note 1, at 499-500.
28. See Malloy, supra note 1, at 1013 (discussing benefits to mortgage lenders and
investors of participation in secondary mortgage market). During periods of increasing interest
rates, mortgage lenders faced a liquidity problem because the lenders issued large amounts of
long-term mortgage debt at low interest rates, yet were dependent on the short-term credit
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Because participation in the secondary mortgage market benefits mort-
gage lenders, the government dominated market experienced explosive growth
during the 1970s and early' 1980s. 29 By the late 1970s private entities, chiefly
savings and loan associ ions and similar mortgage lenders, began entering
the secondary mortgag market by packaging conventional loans and selling
them to private investors and to the federal secondary market agencies.30
Because private investors required that the loans in which they were to
invest be insured against loss should the borrower default, the market forced
mortgage originators to procure insurance on mortgage loans before selling
the loans in the secondary market. 3' The FHA and VA insurance programs
fulfilled this need in the federally sponsored secondary market since the
market's inception. 32 The regulations associated with the federal insurance
programs unduly restricted the types of loans that private issuers could
make and sell in the secondary market. 33 Private mortgage originators,
market as a source of lending funds. Id. at 995. As a result of this phenomenon, the cost of
funds to mortgage insurers often exceeded the yield on long-term home mortgages, and the
amount of funds available consequently declined. Id. The ability to sell mortgage loans in the
secondary market helped alleviate this problem because mortgage lenders were able to extract
funds tied up in long-term, low-yield loans and invest those funds at higher interest rates. Id.
This in turn increased the amount of funds available for mortgage lending. Id.
29. See FHLMC Cnz=N's GUIDE, supra note 1, at 10-11 (discussing growth of federally
sponsored secondary mortgage market).
30. See K. LoRE, supra note 1, at 1-4 to 1-7 (reporting that volume of privately issued
mortgage-backed securities rose from $27 million in 1976 to $1.8 billion in 1979 to $4.7 billion
in 1983); Malloy, supra note 1, at 994 n.23 (discussing advent of private participation in
secondary mortgage market). In 1984 Congress, seeking to encourage private sector activity in
the secondary mortgage market, enacted the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) [SMMEA]. SMMEA amended portions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988), the Federal National
Mortgage Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723(h) (1988), and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (1988), to facilitate entry of private
mortgage issuers into the secondary mortgage market. See generally Abelman, The Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act, 14 RE.L EST. L.J. 136 (1985) (describing purpose and
operation of SMMEA); Pittman, supra note 1, at 498 (discussing policy goals and impact on
secondary mortgage market of SMMEA).
31. See Malloy, supra note 1, at 1003 (discussing importance of private mortgage
insurance to successful participation of private entities in secondary mortgage market); Malloy,
Mortgage Insurers Should Be the Risk Takers, 17 REAL EST. Ray. 94, 95 (1987) [hereinafter
Malloy, Mortgage Insurance] (arguing that current success of private entity participation in
secondary mortgage market is due in part to investors' ability to place confidence in existence
of private or government mortgage insurance on loans purchased in secondary mortgage
market); Disaster Shakes Private Insurers, EuRoMoNEY, June 1986, at 44 (noting that investors
in private secondary mortgage market must rely on presence of private mortgage insurance);
Hector, Insurance That's Not So Sure, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 1985, at 153 (stating that presence
of private mortgage insurance induces investors to place confidence in loans and mortgage-
backed securities sold in secondary market).
32. See Browne, The Private Mortgage Insurance Industry, the Thrift Industry and the
Secondary Mortgage Market: Their Interrelationships, 12 AKRON L. REV. 631, 637-39 (1979)
(discussing role of FHA and VA loan guaranties in secondary mortgage market).
33. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.17 - 265 (1988) (setting loan eligibility requirements for various
1990]
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consequently, sought to replace federal insurance with more flexible private
insurance.14 Private mortgage insurers were able to tailor their product to
the needs of individual lenders by offering services such as twenty-four hour
turnaround time on policy applications and by insuring only a portion of
the loan value at a correspondingly lower premium."
Because of the greater flexibility that private mortgage insurance pro-
vides, lending institutions eagerly have enlisted private insurers to provide
insurance on mortgage loans, particularly on those loans that the originator
intends to package and sell in the secondary market." In a typical conven-
tional mortgage transaction, a lending institution requires the borrower to
obtain private mortgage insurance if the loan amount exceeds eighty percent
of the purchase price of the home. 7 Although the borrower pays the
premiums on the policy, the lender, rather than the borrower, is the insured
party.3" The mortgage insurance policy generally covers twenty to twenty-
five percent of the loan amount on the assumption that any deficiency after
foreclosure will not exceed this amount. 39 Should the borrower default on
the loan, the lender will acquire title to the property and file a claim with
the insurer. 40 A standard policy normally gives the insurer the option either
to pay the lender the face value of the policy and allow the lender to retain
the property or to pay the lender the entire mortgage amount and take title
to the property. 4' The insurer normally will not take title to the property
unless the insurer believes that the housing market will permit the insurer
to sell the property at a price high enough to recover the payment of the
entire mortgage amount plus expenses of foreclosure.
42
FHA mortgage insurance programs); 38 C.F.R. §§ 36.4302 - 36.4364 (1988) (setting loan
eligibility requirements for various VA mortgage insurance programs). Mortgage lenders
objected not only to the restrictions FHA placed on insurable loans, but also to the fact that
FHA insurance covers 100% of the loan value and requires that premiums be paid throughout
the life of the loan. MICA FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 9-10.
34. See Malloy, supra note 1, at 1003 (describing appeal of private mortgage insurance
to participants in secondary mortgage market).
35. See Browne, supra note 32, at 637-39 (discussing restrictions placed on loans eligible
for government mortgage insurance and advent of more flexible private mortgage insurance);
MICA FACT BooK, supra note 1, at 9-10 (same).
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing use of private mortgage insurance
in secondary mortgage market).
37. See MICA FACT BOOK, supra note I, at 7-8 (describing operation of typical private
mortgage insurance policy). In order for the FHLMC to purchase a mortgage loan from the
originator, a FHLMC-qualified private mortgage insurer must insure the portion of the unpaid
principal balance that exceeds 80% of the cost of the home. 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2) (1988).
The FNMA imposes identical insurance requirements on lenders seeking to sell loans to the
FNMA. 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (1988).
38. See MICA FACT BooK, supra note 1, at 7-8 (describing operation of typical mortgage
insurance policy).
39. Id.




The secondary mortgage market benefits home buyers as well as mort-
gage originators. 43 The ability to sell loans in the secondary market encour-
ages mortgage lenders to increase the supply of funds available for mortgage
lending, thereby decreasing the cost of mortgage loan funds to prospective
home buyers. 44 Commentators have estimated that the existence of an
efficiently operating secondary mortgage market may reduce the cost of
home mortgage credit by up to two percent.45 In addition, the emergence
of a national market in mortgage pass-through certificates4 and debt in-
struments collateralized by mortgages facilitates the flow of funds from
areas where surplus funds exist, such as the northeastern states, to areas
experiencing a shortage of funds available for housing loans, such as the
southern and western states. 47
The availability of private mortgage insurance is important to the ability
of private entities to issue mortgage-backed securities in the secondary
mortgage market. If private mortgage insurance is in place on the mortgage
loans, then third party investors may be reasonably confident that an
economic downturn in a particular area will not render their investment
43. See K. LoRE, supra note 1, at 1-30 to 1-33 (describing generally benefits derived
from existence of secondary mortgage market).
44. See id. (describing benefits to home buyers and mortgage lenders from operation of
secondary mortgage market); Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives in The Mortgage-
Backed Security Market, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426, 427 (1983) (describing potential
for secondary mortgage market to reduce cost of mortgage credit); Malloy, supra note 1, at
999 n.l (discussing benefits to home buyers of operation of secondary mortgage market);
Nelson, Special Report: Secondary Mortgage Market Update, U.S. BANKER, Feb. 1984, at 24,
30 (estimating that efficiently operating secondary mortgage market could reduce home mort-
gage credit cost by up to two percent).
45. Lance, supra note 44, at 427. But see Pittman, supra note 1, at 542-43 (discussing
studies suggesting that effect of increased activity in secondary mortgage market on cost of
mortgage credit to homeowners may be less substantial than previously thought).
46. See FHLMC CrrizEN's GUIDE, supra note 1, at 13 (defining mortgage pass-through
certificates and other mortgage-backed securities). Mortgage pass-through certificates are a
common type of mortgage-backed security that provide the investor with a monthly cash flow.
Id. Pass-through certificates give the investor an undivided fractional interest in a pool of
mortgage loans. Id. The mortgage originator or other secondary market firm collects the
borrower's payments of principal and interest and passes the payments through to investors
on a pro rata basis. Id.; Malloy, supra note 1, at 1003-12 (discussing mechanics of mortgage-
backed securities); Pittman, supra note 1, at 499-512 (describing specialized mortgage-backed
securities and mortgage-collateralized debt instruments); Senft, Determining the Yield, in TnE
HANDBOOK OF MORToAGE BANKiNo 473, 499-500 (J. Kinney & R. Garrigan eds. 1985) (discussing
function of mortgage pass-through certificates and other common mortgage-backed securities).
47. See FHLMC CraN's GuoIE, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing ability of secondary
mortgage market to make mortgage loan funds consistently available throughout country
regardless of local economic conditions); K. LoRE, supra note 1, at 1-2 (same); Malloy, supra
note 1, at 1014-15 (discussing ability of secondary mortgage market to facilitate correction of
regional imbalances in demand for mortgage credit); Seiders, The Future of Secondary Mortgage
Markets: Economic Forces and Federal Policies, 3 Housinc; FiN. REv. 319, 324-25 (1984)
(same); Conte & Schellhardt, Big Secondary Market in Mortgages Smooths Flow of Housing
Funds, Wall St. J., July 11, 1983, at 1, col. 6 (discussing function of secondary mortgage
market as conduit for national distribution of mortgage funds).
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worthless. This function of mortgage insurance allows investors who are
geographically distant from the loan originator and the mortgaged real
estate to invest in mortgage-backed securities, confident that the insurer has
taken steps to ensute that the underlying loans are solid and that the risk
involved is within insurable limits.4
Recent developments both within the private mortgage insurance indus-
try and in the courts threaten the continued vitality of private mortgage
insurance as a credit enhancement in the secondary mortgage market.49 The
private mortgage insurance industry suffered losses throughout most of the
1980s because of the high number of defaults that accompanied the economic
downturn of that period.50 During this period private mortgage insurers
paid on claims in excess of premium and investment income earned, and,
consequently, the industry as a whole reported net operating losses in the
years 1985 through 1987. 51 These losses resulted at least in part from a
decline in underwriting standards within the mortgage insurance industry.52
Underwriting standards declined during the late 1970s and early 1980s
for three reasons. First, competition was fierce among private mortgage
insurers during this period. 3 Because insurers offer virtually identical policies
and premium rates,5 4 competition among the companies shifted to other
aspects of the transaction. 5- Lowering underwriting standards became a
primary means of competition.5 6 An individual insurer knew that if the
insurer declined to insure a loan of marginal quality because the loan failed
48. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing credit enhancement function of
private mortgage insurance in secondary mortgage market).
49. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (describing decline of underwriting
standards in private mortgage insurance industry); infra notes 101-119 and accompanying text
(describing issues raised by litigation surrounding failure of EPIC).
50. See MICA FACT BooK, supra note 1, at 22, 24 (describing losses sustained by private
mortgage insurance industry during early 1980s); Greenhouse, The Mortgage Insurers' Woes,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at Dl, col. 3 (describing forces contributing to record losses in
mortgage insurance industry during 1980s).
51. See MICA FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 22, 24 (reporting private mortgage insurance
industry's losses during 1980s); MOODY'S INvEsToRs SERvIcE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRIVATE
MORTGAGE INSURANCE INDUSTRy 3 (1988) [hereinafter MOODY'S REPORT] (reporting additional
industry-wide statistics reflecting losses incurred during years 1985-88). The mortgage insurance
industry as a whole reported losses totalling $72.8 million in 1985, $143 million in 1986, and
$133.1 million in 1987. Id.
52. See Greenhouse, supra note 50, at DI (stating that mortgage insurance industry's
losses during 1980s were due in part to relaxation of formerly conservative underwriting
practices).
53. See Browne, supra note 32, at 641-45 (describing competition among private mortgage
insurers and between private mortgage insurers, government mortgage guaranty agencies, and
lending institution self-insurance programs),
54. Id. at 641. The typical private mortgage insurance policy premium is one-half of one
percent of the loan amount initially and one-fourth of one percent annually for ten years. Id.
55. See MooDY'S REPORT, supra note 51, at 14 (noting that nonprice competition within
private mortgage insurance industry caused fluctuations in underwriting standards).
56. See Browne, supra note 32, at 641 (discussing nonprice competition within the
mortgage insurance industry and consequent decline of underwriting standards).
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to meet the insurer's underwriting standards, another insurance company
almost certainly would be willing to insure such a marginal loan to increase
its premium income. 7 This phenomenon put downward pressure on under-
writing standards."'
A second reason for the decline of underwriting standards was that
interest rates increased spectacularly during the late 1970s and early 1980s.19
This increase in interest rates encouraged mortgage insurers to issue as many
new policies as possible so that the insurers could invest the cash earned
through premium payments at the ever-increasing interest rates, thereby
maximizing both premium and investment income. 60 Driven by a desire to
maximize cash inflow, mortgage insurers further relaxed their underwriting
standards.
Third, mortgage insurers commonly maintained compensating balances
with lending institutions active in originating mortgage loans during the
1970s. 6' The lending institutions agreed to insure loans with a particular
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See D. THORNDUCE, THORNDncE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANuKNo AN FINANCIAL TABLES
1990 YEARBOOK Table 1-1, at part 2, p. 2 (1990) (charting prime lending rate during 1970s
and 1980's reaching high of 21.5076 in 1980).
60. Cf. Insurance Co. of N. Am., Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148, 150
(4th Cir. 1989). United States Gypsum involved an insurer's attempt to rescind a casualty
insurance policy because of the applicant's alleged misrepresentations and omissions. The
Fourth Circuit noted that high interest rates during the years 1979 to 1983 encouraged insurance
companies to issue large numbers of insurance policies without regard to prudent underwriting
practices to maximize revenues for reinvestment at 'higher interest rates. Id. This practice
sometimes is referred to as "cash flow underwriting." Id.; see also Priest, Overaggressiveness
of Mortgage Insurers Haunts Industry, AmsiucAN BANKMR, July 25, 1986, at 7 (discussing
relationship between deterioration of underwriting standards within private mortgage insurance
industry during late 1970s and early 1980s and high inflation levels during same period).
Housing prices also increased dramatically during the inflationary period of the 1970s
and early 1980s. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TE UNITED STATES 478 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce
1989) (reporting average annual increase in median purchase price of existing one-family homes
during 1980s). In CenTrust Mortgage Corp. v. PMI Mortgage Insurance Co., No. 1 CA-CV
88-522 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989), a mortgage lender appealed a decision of the Maricopa
County Superior Court that allowed a private mortgage insurer to rescind mortgage insurance
policies on grounds of misrepresentations that the lender made in the policy applications. See
CenTrust Mortgage Corp. v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., No. C551517, slip op. at 5 (Super Ct.
Maricopa County, Ariz., Dec. 16, 1987) (available from Super. Ct. Maricopa County, Ariz.)
(holding of trial court allowing insurer to rescind policies). On appeal the mortgage lender
argued that the increase in housing prices during the late 1970s encouraged mortgage insurers
to relax their underwriting standards. CenTrust Mortgage Corp.'s Opening Brief at 4, CenTrust
(No. 1 CA-CV 88-522). According to the mortgage lender, when an insured loan went into
default during the period of increasing property values the mortgage insurer would opt to
purchase the property rather than pay the claim in cash. Id. The increasing property values
allowed the mortgage insurers to hold the property for a time, and then sell it at a price high
enough to avoid incurring a loss. Id.
61. See Browne, supra note 32, at 641 (describing practice of private mortgage insurers
of maintaining compensating balances with customer lending institutions and resulting detri-
mental effect on insurers' underwriting standards).
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mortgage insurer in return for maintaining these compensating balances.12
This practice relaxed underwriting standards because the continuing business
relationship between the insurer and the lender encouraged the insurer to
accept a particular lender's loans without due regard for the insurer's normal
underwriting standards. 63 The maintenance of compensating balances with
mortgage lenders virtually has been eliminated in recent years, however,
due to remedial federal regulation and state legislation."
4
The decline in underwriting standards experienced during the early 1980s
becomes critically important when an insured party makes a claim after a
borrower defaults on an insured mortgage loan. Should the insurer believe,
upon receiving a claim, that the lender misrepresented material facts about
the risk of default, the insurer may attempt to avoid liability on the policy
either by bringing an action for rescission of the policy or by raising the
misrepresentations as a defense to an insured's suit to compel payment on
the policy.65 The degree of care that the insurer exercised during the
underwriting process is important both to the court's contract law analysis
and to the continued value of mortgage insurance in the secondary mortgage
market.
66
An insurer generally may rescind a policy that an applicant has obtained
by misrepresentations in the application because an insurance policy is a
conditional contract. 67 Misrepresentation by the insured constitutes a breach
of the terms of the contract and relieves the insurer of its duty to perform
under the contract.68 In cases in which the insured has not knowingly
misrepresented facts in the application process or in which the misrepresen-
tations did not actually cause the insurer to issue the policy, however, courts
have developed doctrines that bar the insurer from rescinding policies
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP., ELioxarry REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE
MORTGAGE INSURERS § 150.2 (1987) (prohibiting FHLMC-qualified private mortgage insurers
from placing compensating balances with customer mortgage lenders); MORTGAGE GUARANTY
INSURANCE MODEL ACT § 4.11 (National Association of Insurance Commissioners 1984)
(prohibiting mortgage insurers from maintaining compensating balances at lending institutions
for which mortgage insurer has insured loans).
65. See generally Brennan & Hanson, Misrepresentation in the Application as the Basis
for Rescission of a Property Insurance Policy, 21 TORT & INs. L.J. 451 (1986) (discussing
insurer's option of bringing suit for rescission or defending suit for nonpayment of claim);
supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing cases involving mortgage insurers' attempts
to rescind policies for misrepresentations by applicant).
66. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between quality
of insurer's underwriting effort and contract doctrines applied to limit insurer's action for
rescission).
67. See generally B. OSTRAGER & T. NEwxAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DxsPUrEs § 3.01, at 54 (1989) (discussing insurer's action for rescission for misrepresentation
in insurance application); R. KEETON & A. Wmiss, INSURANCE LAW § 5.7, at 570 (1988)
(same); Brennan & Hanson, supra note 65 (same); McDowell, The Misrepresentation Defense
in Insurance: A Problem for Contract Theory, 16 CoNN. L. REV. 513 (1984) (same).
68. R. KEETON & A. Wroiss, supra note 67, § 5.7, at 590.
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because allowing rescission in these cases would lead to inequitable results. 9
The first doctrine that operates to limit the insurer's right of rescission
stems from the requisite elements of the equitable remedy of rescission. To
obtain rescission for an applicant's misrepresentation, an insurer must show
that the insurer relied reasonably on the misrepresentation in entering into
the insurance contract.70 Thus, if an insured party negligently omits or
misrepresents a material fact in the application, a court may preclude the
insurer from obtaining rescission if the insurer could have discovered the
falsity through reasonable investigation.71 However, if the insured acted
fraudulently rather than negligently, courts generally will not allow the
insured to claim as a defense to a rescission action that the insurer acted
unreasonably .72
The second principle that operates to limit an insurer's right of rescission
for an applicant's misrepresentation is the equitable doctrine of estoppel.
Similar to the reasonable reliance element of the action for rescission, a
court may apply estoppel doctrine to charge an insurer with knowledge
regarding the insured that the insurer could have discovered by conducting
a reasonable investigation. 73 Under this form of estoppel doctrine, a court
may bar an insurer from rescinding an insurance policy if the insurer induces
an insured to rely reasonably on the insurer's actions or omissions, and the
69. See Note, Waiver, Election and Estoppel in Virginia Insurance Litigation, 48 VA. L.
Ray. 416, 416 n.3 (1962) (discussing inequitable results of insurers' actions for rescission and
rise of doctrines limiting such actions).
70. See A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 672 (4th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987) (stating that insurer must reasonably rely on
misrepresentation); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Strudel, 243 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1957)
(describing requirement that insurer's reliance on misrepresentations by insured be reasonable);
REsTATEMENT (SacoND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1982) (stating that contract is made voidable
for misrepresentation if recipient of misrepresentations was justified in relying on misrepresen-
tations).
71. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148, 153-54
(4th Cir. 1989). In United States Gypsum, a suit by a casualty insurer, the Insurance Company
of North America, to rescind a property insurance policy for alleged negligent failure of the
insured, United States Gypsum, to disclose certain pre-existing risks, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the insurer was under a duty to act reasonably to protect its own interests. Id. The court
also noted that if an insurer acts unreasonably in the underwriting process in order to maximize
revenues, the insurer must accept the consequences of its underwriting decision. Id.
In Stephens v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 742 F.2d 1329 (lth Cir. 1984), a
case involving life insurance in which the insurer sought to avoid the policy on grounds that
the insured failed to disclose a pre-existing heart condition in the application, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that the policy would remain in force if the insurer had notice that would induce
a prudent person to inquire further into the representations made in the application. Stephens,
742 F.2d at 1333.
72. See Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner, Inc. v. Schipa, 585 F. Supp. 245, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that raising negligence of defrauded party as defense to action for
fraud is impermissible because of inherent unfairness of argument).
73. See Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 116 F.2d 705, 707 (10th Cir. 1940)
(stating that insurer can be charged with knowledge of facts available by investigation if put
on notice of those facts), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 561 (1941).
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insured changes position as a result of the insured's reliance. 74 In applying
this form of estoppel, courts often state that if the facts disclosed in the
insurance application put the insurer on "inquiry notice," and the insurer
fails to conduct a reasonable follow-up inquiry into the questionable facts,
the court will preclude the insurer from denying coverage.7
The doctrine of estoppel or inquiry notice and the reasonable reliance
element of the action for rescission allow courts to prevent insurers from
engaging in a practice sometimes known as "post-claim underwriting.
' 76
This practice occurs when an insurer issues policies after only superficial
underwriting to realize large amounts of premium income, and then attempts
to deny coverage on the grounds of misrepresentation by engaging in
aggressive investigation of the risk after the insured makes a claim. Courts
often criticize this practice as unfair because post-claim underwriting allows
an insurer to accept income generated from questionable policies while
knowing that the insurer may, at a later date, raise inaccuracies in the
application as a means of avoiding liability on at least some of the
purportedly insured risk.77
74. See J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9088, at 559 (1986). According
to Appleman:
Where an insurer, or its agent, has knowledge, actual or imputed, of facts under
which the express terms of the policy render it void, or unenforceable from its
inception, and then issues the policy, the issuance is equivalent to an assertion by
the insurer that such facts do not invalidate the policy, and if the insured acted in
good faith, the insurer is thereby estopped after loss from claiming that such acts
avoid its liability thereunder.
d. (footnotes omitted).
75. See J. APPLamAN, supra note 74, § 9086, at 547:
[I]f the insurer has knowledge of acts which would put a reasonable man on inquiry,
or which, if pursued, would give the company actual knowledge of the circumstances,
and it failed to make such inquiry or to pursue such facts, it will be deemed to
have waived its rights. Thus the insurer may be charged with knowledge of facts it
ought to have known.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
76. See, e.g., Major Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 457
F.2d 596, 604-05 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying equitable estoppel to charge insurer with knowledge
of pre-existing medical problems of insured if reasonable investigation would have revealed
such information). Courts often use the reasonable reliance element of the insurer's action for
rescission and the equitable doctrine of estoppel interchangeably in similar or indistinguishable
fact patterns to impose upon the insurer a duty to undertake a reasonable examination of the
applicant when put on inquiry notice. Compare Columbian Nat'l Life, 116 F.2d at 708 (framing
decision explicitly in terms of estoppel) with New York Life Ins. Co. v. Strudel, 243 F.2d 90,
93 (5th Cir. 1957) (framing decision on fact pattern similar to Columbian in terms of failure
to reasonably rely on misrepresentations). Whichever doctrinal label a particular court chooses,
the principles at work are substantially the same in most cases, except where the applicant's
alleged misrepresentations were fraudulent, and the party claiming estoppel is not the original
applicant. See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text (describing application of equitable
estoppel in cases in which insurer seeks rescission after inadequate underwriting against party
other than original applicant).
77. See St. Joseph's Hosp. & Medical Center v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154 Ariz. 307,
314 n.3, 742 P.2d 808, 815 n.3 (1987) (stating that post-claims underwriting allows insurers to
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However, as courts generally will not deny a claim of rescission if the
insured committed fraud rather than negligent misrepresentation, courts
likewise will not permit an applicant to raise the affirmative defense of
estoppel when the misrepresentations were fraudulent. 78 This prohibition
against the use of estoppel by a party guilty of fraud may not apply,
however, if the party asserting the estoppel is not the same party that
fraudulently obtained the insurance. 79 This characteristic of the estoppel
defense is particularly important in the mortgage insurance setting, because
if a mortgage insurance applicant, an originator, sells insured mortgages,
or securities backed by insured mortgages, to a secondary market investor,
the insured party and the party guilty of fraud will no longer be the same
party.
The 1985 failure of Equity Programs Investment Corporation (EPIC)
brought the decline of mortgage insurance underwriting standards as it
relates to the availability of rescission for an insurance applicant's misrep-
resentation to the attention of the courts and the participants in the
secondary mortgage market. The sequence of events leading to this widely
noted failure illustrate the competing interests and policies at issue in
applying existing insurance law to the unique relationship between the private
mortgage insurance industry and the secondary mortgage market.
In 1974 EPIC, a northern Virginia-based company, began a real estate
syndication program designed to take advantage of the secondary mortgage
market and the then-favorable tax treatment of limited partnerships. 0 Under
the investment program, EPIC acted as a general partner and formed limited
partnerships with individual investors as limited partners."' These limited
partnerships acquired residential model homes from builders of large housing
developments.12 The partnerships then leased the homes back to the builder.
83
"place a large number of policies at little cost and realize high profits from the sales" and
allows "the passage of time to root out the bad risks"); Southern United Life Ins. Co. v.
Caves, 481 So. 2d 764, 768 (Miss. 1985) (stating that insurer cannot make intensive investigations
into insured's medical history after inadequately underwriting risk); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v.
McGee, 444 So. 2d 803, 811 (Miss. 1983) (stating that insurer cannot gloss over investigation
of insured's medical history at time of underwriting and then investigate intensively after
insured makes claim).
78. See Goodwin v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 907, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(stating that, because estoppel is equitable doctrine, to apply estoppel in favor of insured
generally requires that insured have acted in good faith).
79. See infra notes 134-51 and accompanying text (discussing application of estoppel
doctrine if insured party has not made misrepresentations).
80. See Girard, Tom Billman and the Great Washington EPIC, READWm's, June 1988,
at 76 (describing principals of EPIC and structure of EPIC plan); Mintz & Crenshaw, Changing
Fortunes: The Transformation of EPIC; A Money Empire Runs Into Trouble, Washington
Post, Nov. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (discussing EPIC plan and events leading to failure of EPIC).
81. In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192, 1198 (E.D. Va. 1988), argued
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This sale and lease-back arrangement allowed builders in need of cash to
liquidate assets that otherwise would have been unproductive until the
builders completed an entire development and sold the model homes.
EPIC Mortgage, Incorporated (EMI), a subsidiary of EPIC, made the
mortgage loans to the partnerships to finance the purchases of the homes.1
4
EMI made the loans on a nonrecourse basis, which effectively limited the
EPIC limited partners' liability to the amount of the limited partners' capital
contributions and any appreciation in the value of the homes."5 After
originating the loans, EMI packaged the loans and sold them either as
whole loans or in the form of pass-through certificates to financial insti-
tutions throughout the country. 6 EMI procured private mortgage insurance
policies on the loans before selling the loans to third party investors.17 As
part of the application process, EPIC provided the insurers with a great
deal of documentation relating to the structure of the EPIC organization
and the nature of the risk associated with the rather unusual plan. 8
According to the EPIC plan, the limited partnerships were to sell the
homes at a profit after the fourth or fifth year, thereby ending the
partnerships' obligations under the mortgages.8 9 For a time the plan operated
as intended, but eventually EPIC became unable to sell the partnership
properties at prices sufficient to retire the mortgage debt.9' Rather than to
acknowledge that the failure to sell the homes posed a threat to the viability
of the program, EPIC chose to conceal the facts from investors in an
attempt to keep the program alive. 9' EPIC began selling the older partnership
properties to newly formed EPIC limited partnerships at prices high enough
to pay off the old loans and return a profit to the old investors. 92 EMI
provided the loans for the sales to the newly formed partnerships. 93 In
addition, EPIC began to appropriate funds from the new partnerships to
satisfy the obligations of the older partnerships. 94 Eventually EPIC increased
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1199. In the early years of the EPIC program the rent that the builders paid
was greater than the market rate and greater than the mortgage payments due from the
partnerships, and EPIC, consequently, termed these partnerships "income partnerships." Id.
at 1198. In the later years of the program EPIC partnerships purchased production homes
and leased the homes to the general public at rent levels below the amount of the necessary
mortgage payments. Id. at 1199. The later partnerships functioned as tax shelters for the
limited partners because of the negative cash flow. Id.
86. Id. at 1203; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing mortgage pass-
through certificates).
87. EPIC, 701 F. Supp. at 1208.
88. Id. at 1203, 1215-16. In EPIC the principal document supplied to the insurers was
known as a Private Placement Offering Memorandum (PPOM). Id. The PPOM was a lengthy
document that described in detail the structure of the EPIC program and the risk associated
with the limited partnerships. Id.
89. Id. at 1204.
90. Id. at 1224-27.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1228-30.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1229.
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acquisitions of new properties to generate more loans and to increase the
resulting cash inflow.95 The partnerships, consequently, became interde-
pendent, and the EPIC program became essentially a giant "pyramid"
scheme.
96
In August 1985 the EPIC pyramid collapsed, sending over 350 partner-
ships into default on mortgage loans totalling approximately $1.4 billion.
97
In the wake of this massive default, the investors and mortgage insurers
learned that EPIC and EMI had been egregiously mismanaged.98 EPIC
officials had misrepresented the stability and structure of the EPIC program
to limited partners, third party investors, and mortgage investors in an
attempt to prop up the failing scheme. 99
The case of In re EPIC Mortgage Insurance Litigation'00 followed the
EPIC default.' 0' In EPIC the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia considered whether the mortgage insurers could rescind
mortgage insurance policies issued on loans that the originator sold to the
third party investors on grounds of the originator's misrepresentations made
in the procurement of the policies. 02 The plaintiffs in EPIC were two large
private mortgage insurance companies. 0 3 The defendants were third party
investors who had purchased whole loans or pass-through certificates in
pools of mortgage loans that EPIC and EMI originated, packaged, and
95. Id. at 1230.
96. Id.; see also Girard, supra note 80, at 81-82 (describing interdependent nature of
EPIC limited partnerships). A "pyramid" or "Ponzi" scheme is a fraudulent practice in which
early investors receive proceeds of later investors' contributions, and the later investors will
receive payments only if the interdependent scheme grows indefinitely. Girard, supra note 80,
at 81.
97. EPIC, 701 F. Supp. at 1201; see also Nash, EPIC Seen Halting All Payments, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at DI, col. 6 (describing failure of EPIC to make interest payments
due on $1.4 billion of mortgage debt).
98. See Girard, supra note 80, at 84-90. EPIC officials represented that the partnerships
were not interdependent, that partnership funds were not commingled, and that EMI was
successfully selling partnership properties after the prescribed period. EPIC, 701 F. Supp. at
1221-22; see also Valentine, Fugitive Head of Md. S & L is Indicted, Washington Post, Jan.
31, 1989, at BI, col. 2 (describing criminal indictment of principals of EPIC for fraud in
connection with management of EPIC-affiliated savings and loan).
99. EPIC, 701 F. Supp. at 1221-23.
100. 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988), argued on appeal sub nom. Foremost Guar.
Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, No. 88-3163 (4th Cir. Oct. 6, 1989).
101. In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988); see also
Abramowitz, Trial to Begin in Suit Over Failure of EPIC, Washington Post, Jan. 4, 1988, at
F8, col. I (describing parties in EPIC litigation).
102. EPIC, 701 F. Supp. at 1192, 1197. In EPIC the defendant third party investors
brought a counterclaim against a plaintiff mortgage insurer for direct and aiding and abetting
violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1988) and 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). EPIC, 701 F. Supp. at 1197. The district court held
that the certificates of participation in insured mortgage loan pools that EMI sold were not
securities for the purposes of the federal securities laws. Id. at 1247-49. The court further held
that the defendants had failed to establish that Foremost had committed any of the requisite
elements of a violation of the antifraud provisions. Id. at 1247-52. Consequently, the court
held for the plaintiff Foremost on the defendants' counterclaims. Id. at 1253.
103. EPIC, 701 F. Supp. at 1197.
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sold. 104 The private mortgage insurers brought suit against the investors
seeking rescission of the policies when, in the aftermath of the August 1985
default, the extent of EPIC's misrepresentations came to light. 105 The
plaintiff mortgage insurers sought rescission of the policies as to the third
party investors on the grounds that the loan originator, EPIC, had procured
the policies by fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the nature of the
loans and the operation of the EPIC program as a whole.10
The investors raised two principal defenses to the mortgage insurers'
action for rescission. First, the investors argued that the insurers unreason-
ably relied on EPIC's representations.'1 7 According to the investors, the
documentation EPIC provided to the insurers contained various "red flags"
that would have put a reasonable insurer on notice that the EPIC loans
were unstable and based on a precarious, interest rate-sensitive scheme, and
the insurers' failure to make a reasonable inquiry after being put on notice
should preclude rescission. 108
Second, the investors argued that the insurers were estopped from
denying coverage under the mortgage insurance policies on the grounds that
the investors relied reasonably on the presence of the insurance by assuming
that the insurers carefully had underwritten the underlying risk. °9 According
to the investors, the insurers knew that third party investors would rely on
the insurers' underwriting in purchasing the EPIC loans and pass-through
certificates, thus making the investors similar to third party beneficiaries of
the insurance contracts, rather than mere assignees."10 The investors argued
that the mortgage insurers were estopped from rescinding the policies because
the insurers failed to make a reasonable examination of the loans before
issuing the policies, which in turn caused the investors to change their
position after relying on the insurers' representations."'
In resolving these arguments, the district court made two legal rulings
that could change significantly the role of private mortgage insurance in
the secondary mortgage market." 2 First, the court found that mortgage
104. Id. at 1197-98. One of the EPIC defendants, the First National Bank of Maryland,
did not own EPIC pass-through securities for its own account, but rather served as custodial
trustee for certain savings and loan associations who had purchased EPIC pass-through
certificates. Id.
105. Id. at 1241, 1218.
106. Id. at 1197.
107. Id. at 1243.
108. See Brief of Appellants at 15-17, 32-36, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank,
No. 88-3163 (4th Cir. filed May 30, 1989) (arguing for investors on appeal that EPIC disclosure
documents contained information that would have put reasonable insurer on notice that risk
of default was extraordinary).




112. See Bus. LAw., supra note 14, at 972, 974-75 (outlining EPIC litigation and discussing
potential significance of court's holdings in secondary mortgage market and private mortgage
insurance industry).
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
insurers were entitled to conduct only "review underwriting," in which the
insurers only review the applications for obvious omissions or mistakes and
need not make any further inquiry into the veracity of the supplied infor-
mation."' Consequently, the court held that the mortgage insurers acted
reasonably in issuing the insurance policies and were entitled to rely solely
on the representations, oral and written, that EPIC made in procuring the
insurance."14
Second, the court found that the third party investors attained no
special status as transferees of the insured loans."' The court found that
the investors were not analogous to third party beneficiaries of the insurance
contracts but were mere assignees of those contracts.1 1 6 The court, conse-
quently, held that the investors as assignees were susceptible to all defenses
that the insurers had against the assignor, EPIC." 7 Accordingly, the court
rescinded the policies held by the investors." 8 The investors appealed the
district court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. 119
The view, typified by the EPIC court's holding, that private mortgage
insurance is indistinguishable from standard forms of insurance, falls to
consider the practical realities of the mortgage insurer's role in the secondary
mortgage market. Private mortgage insurance differs from traditional forms
of insurance in two major respects. These differences dictate that courts
should apply the exceptions to the availability of rescission in a different
manner in the mortgage insurance setting. First, the private mortgage insurer
does not issue policies on the basis of a discrete, standardized form appli-
cation for each individual policy, as is the practice in the traditional life or
casualty insurance setting. 20 Instead, the mortgage insurer issues a master
policy that sets out the general provisions of the insurance contract and
agrees to insure individual loans after receipt of a brief written statement
for each loan.'2' During the master policy application process, the insurer
113. In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192, 1242-46. In holding that the
mortgage insurers had acted reasonably and were entitled to conduct only "review under-
writing," the EPIC court relied principally on the findings of fact made in an unpublished
opinion of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona in CenTrust Mortgage Corp. v.
PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., No. C551517, slip op. (Super. Ct. Ariz. Dec. 10, 1987), appeal
docketed, No. 1 CA-CV 88-522 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1988). In CenTrust the mortgage
insurers obtained rescission of mortgage insurance policies against the originator of the loans,
rather than a secondary market investor, and thus, the case did not present the issue of
reliance by secondary market investors. CenTrust, No. C551517, slip op. at 1, 2.
114. EPIC, 701 F. Supp. at 1242-46.
115. Id. at 1246-47.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1253.
119. Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, No. 88-3163 (4th Cir. May 30, 1989).
The Fourth Circuit has yet to render a decision in Foremost.
120. See Browne, supra note 32, at 640 (describing mechanics of master policy in private
mortgage insurance transaction).
121. MICA FAcT BOOK, supra note 1, at 6 (describing nature of master policy and
subsequent approval of individual loans).
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is able to examine all documentation available to the mortgage originator
and thus has far more opportunity to investigate the nature of the underlying
risk than does a typical life or casualty insurer.' 22 Thus, mortgage insurers
have extraordinary access to information relating to the risk to be insured,
a fact that bears directly on the reasonableness of the insurer's underwriting
effort. ,23
Despite the fact that mortgage insurers have unusually complete access
to information regarding the level of risk associated with the loans to be
insured, mortgage insurers assert that they are entitled to conduct only
"review underwriting."' 24 According to mortgage insurers, review under-
writing consists of only a cursory review of the insurance application to
check for any obvious mistakes or omissions. 25 During oral arguments
before the Fourth Circuit in the EPIC case, the appellee mortgage insurers
asserted that the insurers' underwriting function was "almost administra-
tive" and involved little or no substantive evaluation of risk of default.'
26
These assertions ignore both the representations of the insurers themselves
27
and the legal requirement that insurers must evaluate responsibly the risk
they insure before courts will grant rescission for misrepresentation in the
122. See Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Numerica Fin. Serv., Inc., 835 F.2d 1354, 1358-59
(11th Cir. 1988) In Numerica the Eleventh Circuit held that mortgage insurers are not entitled
to protection of a Florida insurance rescission statute because of the mortgage insurers' unique
ability to examine information relating to risk associated with loan transaction. Id. at 1359.
The Numerica court emphasized that traditional life or casualty insurers issue policies soley
on the basis of discrete, standardized applications, while mortgage insurers have the ability to
examine the original loan documentation and also may seek further information from the
lender. Id. at 1358-59.
123. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (discussing importance of reasonableness
of insurer's underwriting effort to application of contract doctrines limiting insurer's action
for rescission).
124. See MICA FACT BOOK 1988, supra note 1, at 6 (stating that mortgage insurers
underwrite on review basis and take no responsibility for investigating risk of default because
of lender's misrepresentations).
125. See Brief of Appellee at 7-8, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, No. 88-
3163 (4th Cir. filed May 30, 1989) (arguing that private mortgage insurers should be entitled
to conduct review underwriting).
126. Tape of Oral Argument, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, No. 88-3163
(4th Cir. argued Oct. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Foremost Argument] (available from Washington
and Lee Law Review office).
127. See, e.g., MORTGAGE INSURAN E CoMPANiEs OF AiERICA, FACT BOOK AND DIRECTORY
5 (1983-84 ed.) [hereinafter MICA FACTBOOK 1983-84] (stating that private mortgage insurance
companies' "independent third party underwriting protects the lender as well as the investor
should the mortgage subsequently be sold in the secondary market"). Private mortgage insurers
represent in their promotional materials that their underwriting effort exceeds mere review
underwriting:
Yes, we are tough underwriters. We reject those loans that don't meet our standards.
We're selective about the lenders we deal with, too. But our tough underwriting
helps you in the long-run. And we're in the business for the long-run.
Brief Amicus Curiae of The United States League of Savings Institutions at 7, n.4, Foremost
Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Sav. Bank, No. 88-3163 (4th Cir. filed May 30, 1989).
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
application. 28 The view that insurers have no duty to investigate the veracity
of loan originators' representations if irregularities in preliminary application
materials put the insurers on inquiry notice, consequently, is inconsistent
both with familiar principles of insurance law and with the unique function
of private mortgage insurance.
The second major difference between mortgage insurance and traditional
insurance is that mortgage insurers often issue policies on loans with the
knowledge that the applicant mortgage lender intends to package the loans
and sell them to investors in the secondary market. 29 Thus, unlike traditional
insurers, mortgage insurers know that third parties who are strangers to the
insurance contract will rely on the presence of the policies as evidence that
an impartial underwriter has examined the risk involved and determined the
risk to be within insurable limits. 30 This characteristic, peculiar to mortgage
insurance, makes estoppel doctrine particularly applicable to situations such
as the EPIC case in which the party claiming the defense is the third party
investor rather than the original applicant. 3 '
Under general contract law, assignees stand in the shoes of their
assignors and are susceptible to any defenses that the promisor may have
against the assignors. 3 2 If courts treat secondary purchasers of insured
mortgage loans as mere assignees of the insurance contract, then the
secondary purchasers' position will be no better than that of the mortgage
originator.' Thus, in cases in which the loan originator would be unable
128. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing legal limitations on insurer's
action for rescission for misrepresentation); MORTGAGE GUARANTY INsURANCE MODEL ACT §
3.16(c) (National Association of Insurance Commissioners 1984):
No policy or mortgage insurance excluding policies of reinsurance, shall be written
unless and until the insurer shall have conducted a reasonable and thorough exam-
ination of (i) the evidence supporting credit worthiness of the borrower and (ii) the
appraisal report reflecting market evaluation of the property and shall have deter-
mined that prudent underwriting standards have been met.
Id.
129. See MICA FACTBOOK 1983-84, supra note 127, at 5 (stating that one role of private
mortgage insurance is to protect secondary investor if originator sells loan in secondary
market).
130. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing credit enhancement role of
private mortgage insurance).
131. See Verex Assurance, Inc. v. John Hanson Say. & Loan, Inc., 816 F.2d 1296, 1305
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that secondary mortgage market investor raised genuine issues of
material fact as to application of estoppel doctrine to preclude mortgage insurer from rescinding
policies against secondary investor for loan originator's misrepresentations in obtaining policies);
infra notes 134-51 and accompanying text (discussing application of estoppel if party guilty of
misrepresentation is not same party claiming estoppel).
132. See James Talcott, Inc. v. H. Corenzwit & Co., 76 N.J. 305, 307, 387 A.2d 350,
352 (1978) (stating that assignee of chose in action stands in shoes of assignor); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336(1) (1981) (stating that assignee acquires only rights under
contract that assignor had against original obligor).
133. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (discussing EPIC court's holding that
secondary market investors are assignees of mortgage insurance policies and are susceptible to
mortgage insurer's defenses against mortgage lender).
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to avoid rescission because the originator committed fraud rather than
negligent misrepresentation, the secondary investor likewise would be subject
to rescission.
However, if a party claiming under an insurance policy is not the party
guilty of misrepresentation in obtaining the insurance but rather is in the
nature of a third party beneficiary, courts have held that insurers are
estopped from rescinding an insurance policy against that innocent third
party. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit illustrated
this idea in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Eisenberg.34 In Eisenberg the court
considered whether an insurance company could rescind a casualty insurance
policy issued on garments that an insured furrier stored in his storage and
cleaning firm on the grounds that the furrier misrepresented the value of
the insured furs."'s The furrier applied for the insurance and paid the
premiums, but the beneficiaries of the policy were the individuals who stored
their furs with the furrier.'36 The insurance contract required the furrier to
report periodically to the insurer the value of the furs currently stored, 3 7
and the insurer determined the premiums due according to the value of the
furs in storage. 38 After a fire damaged a large number of the insured furs,
the insurance company conducted an investigation which revealed that, to
reduce the required premiums, the furrier underreported the value of the
stored furs. 39 The insurer then brought suit against the furrier seeking to
rescind the policies on the grounds of the misrepresentations.140 The owners
of the insured furs intervened in the action claiming that, even if the insurer
were entitled to rescind the policies as against the furrier, the insurer was
estopped from denying coverage as against the third party owners of the
furs.1
41
The Eighth Circuit first noted that, although the insurance contract
ostensibly insured the furrier, the contract was actually a third party
beneficiary contract in favor of the owners of the stored furs. 42 The court
then made two holdings that shed light on the issues presented in the
mortgage insurance setting. First, the court found that, because the insurer
had ample opportunity under the provisions of the policy to examine the
insured furs as well as the defendant's records but failed to do so, the
insurer was estopped from denying knowledge of the defendant's misrepre-
sentations. 43 Second, the court found that the defendant's customers had
relied upon the presence of the insurance in allowing the defendant to store
134. 294 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1961).
135. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Eisenberg, 294 F.2d 301, 302 (8th Cir. 1961).
136. Id. at 302-03.
137. Id. at 304.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 302.
141. Id. at 302, 305.
142. Id. at 305-06.
143. Id. at 307.
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the customers' furs and that the insurer knew that the policies were intended
to so induce business for the furrier.'"
Applying these findings to the facts of the case, the Eisenberg court
held that the insurer could obtain rescission for misrepresentation against
the insured furrier, but was estopped from raising the furrier's misrepresen-
tations as grounds for rescission against the innocent third parties.145 The
court held that the individual customers had reasonably relied upon the
insurer's representations that the furs would be insured and that the cus-
tomers had detrimentally changed their position by storing the furs with
the defendant. 1" For these reasons, the insurer's defense against the appli-
cant was cut off as against the innocent third parties.
47
Although the facts of Eisenberg differ from the normal mortgage
insurance situation in that the mortgage originator actually assigns the policy
to the secondary investors, this difference is insignificant when the practical
relationships of the parties are compared. In the mortgage insurance setting,
as in Eisenberg, the insurance applicant procures insurance principally to
induce third parties to place trust in the applicant, either by purchasing
mortgage-backed securities or by purchasing storage services.'" In both
instances, the insurer and the insured represent the presence of insurance
to third parties in such a manner as to induce trust, and both are aware
that third parties will rely on the presence of insurance in their decision
making process. 49 Finally, in both Eisenberg and the mortgage insurance
setting, the insurer has the ability to protect against misrepresentations by
making a reasonable inquiry into the risk.5 0 The estoppel doctrine illustrated
in Eisenberg and similar cases,'.' therefore, permits courts to prevent mort-
144. Id. at 304. The Eisenberg court found that the defendant advertised extensively that
the plaintiff insurance company would insure furs stored at the defendant's place of business
and that the plaintiff supplied advertising materials to facilitate these representations. Id. This
promotional activity is analogous to the role of private mortgage insurance in the secondary
mortgage market and to the representations made by the mortgage insurers in that setting.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing mortgage insurers' representations about
underwriting efforts).
145. Eisenberg, 294 F.2d at 308.
146. Id.
147. Id. In addition to holding that the insurer was estopped from rescinding the policies
against the customers, the Eisenberg court also found that the furrier was the insurance
company's agent for the purposes of soliciting insurance business. Id. at 309-10. The court,
however, made clear that the insurer was estopped, without regard to the agency relationship,
from rescinding the policies against the customers. Id. at 308-09.
148. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing function of mortgage insurance
in inducing investor confidence in mortgage-backed securities).'
149. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting that one function of private
mortgage insurance is to secure secondary market investors against loss because of borrower's
default).
150. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (discussing extraordinary ability of
mortgage insurer to inquire into information pertinent to risk of default).
151. See Levy v. Empire Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 860, 863 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding insurer of
debentures estopped from denying formation of insurance contract against purchasers of
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gage insurers from rescinding mortgage insurance policies against innocent
secondary market investors if the insurer failed to inquire reasonably into
the nature of the risk insured.
To ensure the continued viability of private mortgage insurance as a
component of private entity involvement in the secondary mortgage market,
courts should impose a duty on mortgage insurers to engage in reasonably
diligent underwriting of risk before issuing policies. The efficient operation
of a national secondary mortgage market allows funds available for mort-
gage lending to flow from regions where surplus funds exist to regions
experiencing a shortage of available funds, such as the rapidly growing
southwestern states. 52 Mortgage lenders benefit from the liquidity and
flexibility that the secondary mortgage market provides, 53 and home buyers
benefit from the consequent increase in supply of mortgage credit.
54 If
mortgage insurers are able to conduct only review underwriting when issuing
policies and then aggressively investigate the risk associated with the loans
only after an insured makes a claim, the privately sponsored segment of
the secondary mortgage market will be unable to function effectively. 5
Mortgage insurers argue that investors in the secondary mortgage market
should bear the full risk of loss resulting from mortgage originators'
misrepresentations.5 6 While investors undoubtedly should be responsible for
a portion of the risk, this argument ignores a fundamental tenet of risk
allocation in a market economy. This tenet holds that if risk of loss must
fall on one of two equally innocent parties, the secondary market investor
or the private mortgage insurer in the EPIC fact pattern, the risk should
rest with the party that is best able to appreciate the nature of the risk and
to guard against the risk. 5 7 Mortgage insurers by their very nature are more
debentures when purchasers relied upon insurer's representations that insurance was in place);
Simmons v. Western Assurance Co., 205 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that district
court erred in failing to instruct jury that estoppel in pais might prevent insurer from rescinding
casualty insurance policy that lessee of equipment procured for purpose of inducing lessor to
continue lease).
152. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing role of secondary mortgage
market in equalizing geographic disparities in demand for mortgage credit).
153. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing benefits to mortgage originators
of participation in secondary mortgage market).
154. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (describing beneficial impact of sec-
ondary mortgage market on availability of mortgage credit).
155. See Malloy, Mortgage Insurance, supra note 31, at 96 (arguing that investor confi-
dence in underwriting effort of private mortgage insurers is crucial to efficient operation of
secondary mortgage market).
156. Foremost Argument, supra note 126.
157. See Malloy, Mortgage Insurance, supra note 31, at 96 (arguing that in voluntary
exchange, risk of loss should rest on party best able to appreciate risk and to prevent or
reduce risk, or on party best able to insure against risk). Courts recognize that if one of two
equally innocent parties must suffer a loss, the loss should fall on the party that best could
have prevented the loss. This idea, sometimes referred to as the "innocent party doctrine,"
parallels the economic argument that the risk of loss should rest with the party best able to
insure against the risk. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Eisenberg, 294 F.2d 301, 308 (Sth Cir.
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able to investigate and appreciate the risks associated with particular loans.""
Mortgage insurers indeed hold themselves out as experts in risk evaluation
and are able to influence the lending policies of mortgage originators by
setting and enforcing internal underwriting standards.s 9 Secondary market
investors, on the other hand, often are geographically 'distant from the
properties involved and must be able to rely on the mortgage insurer's
greater access to relevant information if the private segment of the secondary
mortgage market is to continue to act to remedy regional imbalances in the
supply of mortgage credit.160 Thus, when a mortgage insurer attempts, after
inadequate underwriting, to shift the full risk of default to the secondary
market investor, courts should intervene to place that risk upon the mortgage
insurer, where properly it lies.
Mortgage insurers further argue that, because the marketplace already
offers heightened protection against an originator's or borrower's infidelity,
courts should not hold that standard private mortgage insurance policies
cover risk of default due to fraud or misrepresentation. This extended
protection is known in the industry as a "fraud bond"161 and is available
at an increased cost. If a party desires even greater protection against fraud,
the party can have a particular loan investigated more extensively, again at
a higher cost. This investigative service is known as "contract underwrit-
ing. 162
The availability of fraud bonds and contract underwriting gives rise to
an argument that the law should not impose a duty of inquiry upon mortgage
insurers if the operation of market forces would reach the same result.
According to this reasoning, as loan originators and secondary investors
learn that mortgage insurers easily can avoid standard mortgage insurance
policies on grounds of misrepresentation by originators or borrowers, ori-
ginators and investors simply will buy fraud bonds or contract underwriting.
1961) (stating that if one of two innocent parties must suffer loss, party who enabled third
person to perpetrate fraud should suffer loss); Levy v. Empire Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 860, 863
(5th Cir. 1967) (citing Georgia statute providing "[w]hen one of two innocent persons must
suffer by the acts of a third person, he who put it in the power of the third person to inflict
the injury shall bear the loss"); Bunge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 31 N.Y.2d
223, 228, 286 N.E.2d 903, 905 (1972) (stating in commercial paper setting that if one of two
innocent persons must suffer from fraudulent acts of third party, party who made third party's
misdeeds possible should bear loss).
158. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (describing unique ability of mortgage
insurers to obtain information regarding risk to be insured).
159. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing representations of private
mortgage insurers that underwriting process involves stringent, substantive evaluation of risk).
160. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing ability of efficiently operating
secondary mortgage market to alleviate geographical imbalances in demand for mortgage
credit).
161. See In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192, 1238 (E.D. Va. 1988)
(describing fraud bond).
162. Id. (describing contract underwriting); see also Brief for Appellees at 8-9, Foremost
Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, No. 88-3163 (4th Cir. filed May 30, 1989) (describing
fraud bonds and contract underwriting).
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Thus, insurers could argue that the mortgage insurance industry presently
is a two-tiered system, with different levels of protection available at
different premium levels. According to this argument, to impose a general
duty to underwrite against fraud would only turn the current two-tiered
system into a one-tiered system at a uniformly higher price, thereby elimi-
nating the choice of degree of coverage available to loan originators and
secondary market investors.
This argument considerably overstates the effect of the application of
the law of rescission and equitable estoppel doctrine to the mortgage
insurance industry. Properly applied, the contract doctrines of reasonable
reliance and equitable estoppel would not impose absolute liability upon
mortgage insurers in every instance in which the mortgage originator or
borrower attempts to defraud an insurer. To the contrary, mortgage insurers
would remain free to rescind policies, even against secondary investors, so
long as the mortgage insurer took reasonable steps to protect itself and the
investor by examining the information to which the insurer has such
extraordinary access.163 Courts would determine what constitutes a reason-
able inquiry, a task that courts long have performed in the traditional
insurance setting. 64 Far from imposing the full risk of fraud on the mortgage
insurer, application of these principles would prevent the inequitable practice
of post-claims underwriting and would exert pressure on mortgage insurers
to maintain underwriting standards commensurate with the insurers' repre-
sentations and the secondary market investors' reasonable expectations.
Thus, the existance in the marketplace of heightened protection against
fraud on the part of the originator or borrower does not alter the conclusion
that mortgage insurers should have a duty to examine diligently the extent
of the risk of default due to misrepresentation even under a standard
mortgage insurance policy.
The price of standard mortgage insurance undoubtedly will rise should
courts apply contract doctrines to limit the mortgage insurer's action for
rescission against secondary market investors. Mortgage insurers then might
choose to offer a reduced form of coverage at a reduced price, a form of
coverage that explicitly does not involve any substantive evaluation of the
risk associated with the loan. In this manner the mortgage insurance industry
would develop as a two-tiered system in which, unlike under the present
system, the premium structure of the insurance policies offered would bear
a rational relationship to the level of underwriting involved and to the
representations of the mortgage insurers. Under such a two-tiered system,
163. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (discussing contract doctrines operating
to compel reasonably competent underwriting effort by mortgage insurers).
164. See, e.g., Stephens v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 1329, 1335 n.7 (11th Cir.
1984) (listing representative cases in which courts found various responses in insurance appli-
cation put insurers on inquiry notice); J. APPL. AN, supra note 75, at § 9086, at 546-52
(discussing conditions under which, when applying estoppel doctrine to bar insurer from
rescinding policies, court will charge insurer with constructive knowledge of facts material to
evaluation of risk).
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mortgage originators and secondary market investors would be free to decide
upon which party the risk of loss due to misrepresentation would fall before
the transaction takes place, and no uncertainty as to where the risk of
misrepresentation lies would exist.
Private mortgage insurance plays an important role in the issuance of
privately issued mortgage-backed securities in the secondary mortgage mar-
ket. 65 Insurers issue policies with the knowledge that third party investors
look to the presence of mortgage insurance as evidence that an independent
underwriter reasonably has examined the stability of the insured loans,1
66
In this way, mortgage insurance serves a credit enhancement function in
the secondary market. 67 Because of nonprice competition within the mort-
gage insurance industry and the soaring interest rates of the late 1970s and
early 1980s, insurers have relaxed their underwriting standards so far as to
threaten the important and accepted credit enhancement role of private
mortgage insurance. 68 Courts should apply existing principles of contract
and insurance law to induce insurers to exercise reasonable care in under-
writing the risk of default and to prevent the inequitable practice of post-
claim underwriting. 69 If the law allows mortgage insurers to conduct su-
perficial underwriting and then walk away from policies when a claim
reveals the true nature of the risk, private entity participation in the
secondary mortgage market will decline, and home buyers will suffer from
the resulting decrease in funds available for mortgage lending.
70
FRANKin~ D. CoRDELL
165. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing function of private mortgage
insurance in secondary mortgage market).
166. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing private mortgage insurers'
representations regarding role of insurance in sale of insured loans in secondary mortgage
market).
167. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing role of private mortgage
insurance in secondary mortgage market),
168. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text (describing decline of underwriting
standards in private mortgage insurance industry).
169. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (describing contract doctrines that
courts may use to limit mortgage insurers' action for rescission and to induce prudent,
meaningful underwriting).
170. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (describing benefits to home buyers of
efficiently operating secondary mortgage market).
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ADDENDUM
On October 6, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rendered its decision in the mortgage insurers' appeal of the Eastern
District of Virginia's holding in EPIC. The Fourth Circuit, in Foremost
Guaranty Corp. v. Meritor Savings Bank, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 13414
(4th Cir.), reversed the district court's grant of rescission to the mortgage
insurers. In reversing the district court's holding, the Fourth Circuit held
that the mortgage insurers were not entitled to rely on the EPIC officials'
oral representations regarding the financial condition and structure of the
complex and risky EPIC plan. According to the court, the mortgage insurers
had in their possession documents provided by EPIC that directly contro-
verted the EPIC officials' oral representations. Had the mortgage insurers
undertaken a reasonably diligent investigation of these materials, the insurers
would have discovered that conditions were not as reported by the principals
of EPIC. Thus, the court held that the insurers will be charged with the
knowledge that would have resulted from a reasonable investigation, thereby
preventing the insurers from satisfying the reasonable reliance element of
an action for rescission.
Although the Fourth Circuit held for the policyholders in reversing the
district court's decision, the opinion, authored by Judge Widener, does not
address the potential impact of the decision upon private entity participation
in the secondary mortgage market. Instead, the court chose to decide the
case on narrow and familiar principles of insurance law without pausing to
comment on the broader implications of the opinion. Despite the absence
of any discussion of the utility of private mortgage insurance in the
secondary mortgage market, the opinion nevertheless represents a vindication
of the principle that when insurers undertake to evaluate and insure a given
risk, they indeed must engage in a reasonably diligent investigation into the
actual nature of the insured risk. It seems clear that the Foremost opinion
is a victory for private participants in the secondary mortgage market and,
if indirectly, for home buyers throughout the nation.
